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ABSTRACT
Spontaneous trait inferences have been the focus of impression formation research for
nearly a century. Spontaneous trait inferences impact the judgments and decisions we make
about these objects and people particularly when the group membership of that object or person
is meaningful to us, such as their race/ethnicity. Research on extralist cues has suggested the
spontaneous trait interferences act via the encoding specificity principle: only items stored can be
retrieved, and the effectiveness of retrieval depends on the contextual information that is stored
with the word in episode memory. Other research suggests that stereotypes may disrupt the
spontaneous inferences process. However, no research has been conducted to investigate the
degree to which racial stereotypes may impact the spontaneous trait-inferencing process based on
face-type. This present research presented participants with a variety of behavioral sentences
paired with photographs of people. Participants then saw a trait probe word that was related to
the behavior sentence. The behavior sentences varied in the degree to which they may be
considered stereotypical of African American individuals. The faces presented also varied in the
degree to which they will be considered prototypical of an African American face. I expected
that the degree to which a face is considered to be prototypical of race would influence the
stereotypical associations that were activated. I expected that the activation of stereotypical
knowledge would impact the speed at which people responded to the trait probe word. However,
the results suggest that all African American faces, regardless of face-type, were categorized
similarly and elicited similar inferencing responses. Implications from this present research could
suggest that no matter how representative a face may be of a racial category, if that face is
categorized within a particular race, there may similar consequences in the initial impression
formation stages for all faces. Implications from the research will aid in the development of bias

prevention by illustrating the ways in which people encode information about others and their
behaviors.
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1
1

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

People often spontaneously form impressions of others without necessarily having any
particular goal or an intention to do so (Todorov & Uleman, 2002). Impressions may be
influenced by a variety of characteristics and features in the social environment. Salient features
about a person—such as gender, age, and race—can automatically activate associated
stereotypes and influence spontaneous inferences that impact impression formation (Wigboldus,
Dijksterhuis, & van Knippenberg, 2003; Wigboldus, Sherman, Franzese, & van Knippenberg,
2004; Yan, Wang, & Zhang, 2012). Activated stereotypes can simplify information processing
by serving as efficiency devices and cognitive shortcuts (Macrae, Milne, & Bodenhausen, 1994).
Although stereotypes allow individuals to handle issues more effortlessly and efficiently, they
also may cause inaccurate perceptions of others (Bargh, 1999; Fiske, 1998). Otherwise typically
occurring spontaneous trait inferences may be less likely when an activated stereotype is
inconsistent with the behavior. This can cause people to inhibit positive inferred traits that they
may otherwise have been extended to someone had there not been a competing negative
activated stereotype associated with the person (or vice versa). Understanding the cognitive
mechanisms that underlie spontaneous trait inferencing—including the impact of stereotypes—
may aid in the development of preventions and training geared towards decreasing negatively
biased judgment and decision-making about others.
Cognitive and social psychologists have studied spontaneous trait inferences for over 70
years. With origins in research related to person perception and impression formation (Asch,
1946; Tagiuri & Petrullo, 1958), spontaneous trait inferences are thought to be the process of
inferring personality traits about an actor’s behavior (that may be diagnostic of future behaviors),
generally without any awareness or intention (Orghian, Ramos, Garcia-Marques, & Uleman,
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2019; Winter & Uleman, 1984). Aside from the spontaneous trait inferences that people make
from observed behavior, people also make overgeneralized stereotypical inferences based on
group membership, particularly related to salient group memberships.
One research question that has not been explored is the degree to which racially
stereotypical knowledge impacts the spontaneous trait inferencing process via a recognition
probe paradigm. There is an abundance of literature to suggest that racial stereotypes regarding
African Americans are most often negative. For example, one prevailing and ubiquitous
stereotype is the association of Black males with assumed criminality and violent behavior
(Correll, Park, Judd, & Wittenbrink, 2002; Devine & Elliot, 1995; Dovidio, Evans, & Tyler,
1986; Niemann, Jennings, Rozelle, Baxter, & Sullivan, 1994). Historically, Black Americans
have been subject to racism at all levels of society. The association has been cyclical, with
negative stereotypes contributing to racism and racism contributing to negative stereotypes.
(Kleider-Offutt, Bond, & Hegerty, 2017).
Science has not been immune to the dark past: dating back to the 19th century, researchers
investigating the physical differences in facial structure between Black and White individuals
was amongst many forms of scientific racism (see Guthrie, 2004 for review). According to
Gould (1996), Samuel Morton (Morton, 1849) is most prominently known for his research on
skull-size differences between Black and White individuals. Morton concluded that the skulls of
Black people were significantly smaller than that of White people, implying differences in brain
size. Those findings seemed to support the stereotype that Black individuals were inferior to
White individuals in terms of intellectual/cognitive ability and essentially justifying stark
disparities in legal, economic, and social status. other researchers of the time seemed to replicate
these results Other researchers of the time seemed to replicate these results (Gould & Gold,
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1996; Nott & Gliddon, 1854) and thus provided more evidence to the assumed inferior and
dehumanized status of Black individuals. This research has since been widely discredited and is
now understood to be one of many forms of scientific racism (Menand, 2001).
Present-day media portrayals further perpetuate these associations (Travis Lash Dixon &
Maddox, 2005) through misrepresentation of Black Americans as the perpetrators of crime (see
also Dixon & Linz, 2000a, 2000b). Rothbart, Fulero, Jensen, Howard, and Birrell (1978) drew
implications from their research to suggest—because much of the information we learn about
groups (particularly minority groups) is through news media, and because news media tends to
present the most extreme offenses—that we tend to overrepresent the extreme behavior towards
these depicted groups. Although the effects of news media are still prevalent to date (Dixon,
2008; Dixon, 2017; Dixon and Williams, 2014; Hurley, Jenson, Weaver, & Dixon, 2015) other
mainstream media depictions (e.g., non-news TV, movies, social media) of African Americans
also play a similar role (Abraham, 2003; Adams-Bass, Stevenson, & Kotzin, 2014).
It is possible that the pervasive and ubiquitous negative stereotype of Black Americans—
being associated with assumed criminality and violence and also in addition to the more positive
stereotypes (i.e., athletic, rhythmic)—may affect (whether in an inhibiting or a facilitating role)
the spontaneous trait inferencing process. If racially stereotypical knowledge impacts the
spontaneous trait inferencing process, in a way similar to stereotypes associated with
occupational category labels (Wigboldus, Dijksterhuis, & van Knippenberg, 2003), then there
should be similar differences in the way people respond to relevant traits when viewing faces
that are highly representative (prototypical) of a race compared to less representative of a race
(not prototypical) paired with behaviors.
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There are two related questions that seem to drive knowledge and understanding
regarding spontaneous trait inferences (Uleman, Newman, & Winter, 1992). First, what are the
minimal conditions needed to go beyond simply perceiving and categorizing objects to more
complex cognition operations like drawing inferential knowledge (e.g., personality traits) about
those objects? Second, do such inferences require volition (or intentions, incentives, or
motivations) or conscious awareness to occur? To answer these questions, there has been a great
deal of research to explore how cognitive mechanisms may facilitate spontaneous trait
inferencing and impact their outcomes. One understanding gained from this research is that
inferences occur in a multi-stage process (Bassili, 1989a, 1989b; Gilbert, Krull, & Pelham, 1988;
Kintsch, 1988; Whitney, Waring, & Zingmark, 1992). This literature suggests (a) information is
attended to based on relevant knowledge and the associated category is activated as the result of
stimulus processing; (b) relevant information stored in long-term memory may be connected
later (categorized) to the stimulus representation; and (c) additional information from the social
environment and long-term memory may result in revision of the constructed representation.
Each substage of the trait inferencing process, as well as their outcomes (e.g., the judgments and
decisions we may make based on the information we encode), will be explored further.
Specifically, I investigated how judgments, impacted by stereotypes, interfere with the
spontaneous trait inferencing process and the subsequent decisions people make based on the
information encoded.
1.1

Attention
1.1.1

Spontaneous Trait Inferences

For people to manage large amounts of complex social information, they must selectively
attend to certain features of a stimulus field before further processing the information (e.g.,
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assigning stimuli to categories). thus, reducing the amount of information being processed when
make a judgment or decision (Bargh & Pietromonaco, 1982). A related research question is: to
what degree must people attend to behavioral information to facilitate spontaneous trait
inferences? Uleman, Moskowitz, Roman, and Rhee (1993) investigated this while manipulating
the amount of attention participants could give to behavioral sentences at encoding. Their results
across two studies suggested that people recall sentences better when they have trait-implying
cues available than when recalling the sentences with no cue, even under incidental conditions.
Another heavily debated area of investigation regarding spontaneous trait inferences is
whether they are automatic or controlled processes. Posner and Snyder (1975), Shiffrin and
Schneider (1977; 1977), and Logan (1984) were a few of the frontrunners to propose models of
automatic versus conscious (controlled) processing. Posner and Snyder (1975) proposed three
criteria for considering a cognitive process to be automatic: (a) it occurs without intention, (b) it
occurs outside of conscious awareness and (c) it occurs without interfering with other mental
activity. Conscious (controlled) processing requires attention, awareness and does interfere with
other mental activity. Logan’s model was similar to the Posner-Snyder’s model and further
suggested that automatic processes were either relatively permanent, or rehearsed to such a
degree that they are not easily malleable. Shiffrin and Schneider’s general theory of information
processing was also similar to the Posner-Snyder model further emphasizing that automatic
processes were well-learned and generally independent of on the amount of cognitive resources
available. Conscious, controlled processes, on the other hand, were considered more demanding
of processing capacity. Taken together, these models suggest that automaticity requires less
effort than controlled processes and they are largely determined by intention, awareness and the
degree to which cognitive processes are dependent on the cognitive resources available.
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People make trait inferences without any intentions to do so and with little to no
awareness of having made them (Uleman, 1987; Winter & Uleman, 1984; Winter, Uleman, &
Cunniff, 1985). At best, people may have a weak and fleeting awareness of making trait
inferences at encoding, but there is no evidence to suggest people have any awareness of these
inferences immediately after recall. Automatic processes are unaffected by limitations in
cognitive capacity; even when people are cognitively taxed, automatic processes should persist
with minimal or no disruption (McLeod, 1977; Stager & Zufelt, 1972; Uleman et al., 1992).
Broadbent (1958) considered cognitive resources to be a single yet flexible facility of limited
capacity (Engle, Kane, & Tuholski, 1999; Just & Carpenter, 1992). A person’s performance will
deteriorate as processing demand begins to exceed the limited capacity system. This suggests
that dual-task performance would be unimpaired as long as the amount of resources needed to
conduct the two concurrent tasks does not exceed the total resources available. Although it is
now known processing capacity overload for dual tasks is more likely to be domain-specific,
rather than a single capacity system, cognitive scientists generally agree that dual-tasks are more
likely to be successfully completed when both tasks are automatic compared to controlled
(Mcleod, 1977). Conversely, detriments in performance on dual-tasks success would suggest that
at least one of the tasks is more controlled compared to automatic. This is no different from
other perceptual process that seem to fall on the automatic to controlled spectrum. For example,
even a perceptual process such as attentional capture to threatening stimuli are considered to not
be a completely bottom-up, automatic process (Fabio & Caprì, 2019).
Although there is evidence to suggest that spontaneous trait inferences occur with little or
no awareness and without intention, there is also evidence to indicate that when instructed to do
so, people have the ability to attend to their inferences (initiate), not attend to them (inhibit) and
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even stop attending after initiation (Uleman, 1987). Because of this, spontaneous trait inferences
are thought to reside somewhere between being an automatic and controlled process. Heider
(1982) suggested that spontaneous trait inferences may occur on a continuum ranging from being
completely unaware of the factors influencing social judgments to being fully cognizant of the
cues shaping these judgments. Where spontaneous trait inferences fall on the automatic to
controlled spectrum is thus likely to be dependent on the instructions, context, and additional
information available at the time of encoding. For this reason, Uleman et al. (1992) argued that
spontaneous trait inferences are not automatic based on capacity or inhibition criterion; rather
they are best characterized as “spontaneous” because although they may occur without intentions
or awareness, they do still require some amount of cognitive capacity and can be inhibited and
terminated. Evidence suggests a distinction between the automaticity of spontaneous trait
inferencing and trait activation automatically leading to categorization. If trait activation occurs,
it seems automatically to lead to the categorization of behavior. This may or may not also result
in automatic spontaneous trait inferencing. Once a trait is activated and used to identify a
behavior, its readily accessible nature seems to increase the likelihood that it will facilitate
subsequent information processing which may be used to make judgments and decisions about
people (Bassili, 1989b; Newman, 1993). Simply state, spontaneous trait inferences can be
augmented, controlled, or inhibited under the right conditions.
When participants were shown behavioral sentences and were instructed to form
impressions about the actors performing the behaviors, trait cue effectiveness significantly
improved sentence recall at test compared to participants who are not given the same impression
formation instructions (Bassili & Smith, 1986). Further, spontaneous trait inferences may not
only occur when information is present and attended to (Uleman, 1987; Uleman, Newman, &
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Winter, 1987). When participants read behavioral sentences and then received instructions
unrelated to the traits implied by these sentences (e.g., write down a word that rhymes with a
word in the sentence), there was a significant reduction in cued recall. However, when the
instructions required meaning extraction, spontaneous trait inferencing did occur with trait cued
recall being the most effective compared to semantic or non-cued recall. This suggests that
processing goals may inhibit the social inferences people would otherwise make.
1.1.2

Race and Stereotypes

Stereotypes are positive or negative beliefs held about a particular groups’ behavior and
attributes (see review in Fiske, 1998). Many stereotypes are learned early in life and are
considered to be such well-established associations (Allport, Clark, & Pettigrew, 1954; Devine,
1989), that they are automatically activated in the presence of a stimulus from the stereotyped
group. This activation occurs despite efforts to control the process (E. Smith & Branscombe,
1984), regardless of prejudice level (Devine, 1989, 2001). There is a large body of research to
suggest that stereotypes directly impact what people pay attention to and subsequently the degree
to which they remember those objects at a later time (see also Memory section, below). For
example, threatening stimuli (such as snakes) in particular seem to bias or capture visual
attention (Öhman & Mineka, 2001). More recently, Koster, Crombez, Verschuere, and De
Houwer (2004) used an attentional dot-probe task to show certain stimuli that may have fearbased associations capture attention faster and hold attention longer than neutral stimuli. In
addition, faces seem to capture attention preferentially in a way that other objects do not (Ro,
Russell, & Lavie, 2001). In a study using a change blindness paradigm, Ro et al. (2001) all found
that changes in faces were detected more quickly and accurately compared to changes in other
objects. Similar to findings by Koster et al. (2004), this detection of faces seems to be
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particularly strong when researchers manipulated the emotions displayed by the face, such that
faces judged to be angry or threatening garnered a stronger attentional response compared to
neutral and happy faces. This suggests that certain faces, particularly those interpreted to be
threatening, are more likely to garner attention compared to other faces. Neurological evidence
(Lieberman, Hariri, Jarcho, Eisenberger, & Bookheimer, 2005) seems to suggest that people
display selective attention to Black faces compared to White. This could be related perceived
threat Black faces evoke likely related to the stereotypes people hold (Lieberman, Hariri, Jarcho,
Eisenberger, & Bookheimer, 2005).
1.2

Knowledge and Categorization
Rogers and Cox (2015) defined conceptual knowledge as knowledge that enables people

to recognize and make inferences about objects and their respective properties or features.
Although concepts have been defined and discussed in many ways, they are considered to be the
“mental representation of a particular class or individual” (Smith, 1989, p. 502). Concepts
provide us with the meaning of objects and the rules for sorting these objects into categories
(Kiefer & Pulvermüller, 2012). Similarly, information about our social world is organized by
concepts. Social concepts embody our knowledge about a social category and its members
(Kunda, 1999). Like categorizing objects, grouping people together is not necessarily
determined by objective knowledge; it reflects people’s understanding of the groupings that are
most likely to be meaningful. For example, it could technically be just as likely for people to be
grouped by shoe size as by skin color, but personal experience may determine skin color to be
more meaningful, and thus people may be more likely to group people by skin tone over shoe
size (Kunda, 1999). When conceptualizing “meaningful”, it is best to consider multiple
definitions of the word (Dictionary, 1989): “meaningful” as something that may (a) be important,
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serious, significant and (b) have a recognizable function in a language system. The former
encompasses the amount of relevant information that is tied to an object. Having more relevant
information associated with the object increases the amount of meaning that object has to us. The
latter encompasses the degree to which that object is useful and aids in navigating our
environment or the degree to which the object aids in making judgments and decisions
1.2.1

Spontaneous Trait Inferences

Traits are included in the concepts, and subsequent rules for categorization, that people
use to represent other people (Peabody, 1967; Uleman et al., 1993; Zanna & Hamilton, 1972).
The concepts (and their respective categories) that are activated when navigating our social
world play a major role in how we interpret and understand the events and people we encounter
(e.g., the impression we form; Kunda, 1999). Social and cognitive psychologists have taken great
interest in understanding the determining factors that lead to the activation of a concept.
Concepts, and their respective category members, may be activated in a few different ways
including salience, chronic category accessibility, and priming (Kunda, 1999)—all of which
impact the use of spontaneous trait inferencing.
Category accessibility (or salience) is crucial in perception due to the ambiguity of social
information (Bruner, 1957). When a relevant category is readily accessible, it may serve as the
best fit for making sense of particularly ambiguous information (Bargh & Pietromonaco, 1982;
Bruner, 1957). The degree to which a category may be chronically accessible is related to the
frequency of use: the more a category is used, the more accessible it is (Hayes-Roth, 1977;
Higgins et al., 1982; Srull & Wyer, 1979, 1980). Higgins and colleagues (1982) showed
participants trait words that were either positive or negative. Participants were asked to
memorize these words then were shown ambiguous behavioral sentences. As expected,
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participants were more likely to evaluate the target actor in congruence with the trait (either
positive or negative) that they saw earlier. This early activated trait category was more accessible
due to its recent use and due to being used to process subsequent trait-relevant information.
Priming occurs when the presentation of one stimulus alters the way we respond to
another stimulus due to the ease of accessibility of relevant information facilitated by the first
stimulus (Hillenger, 1980). Newman and Uleman (1990) investigated assimilation and contrast
effects using a priming paradigm to test how the effectiveness of traits for cueing recall of
behaviors reflects how trait inferences are encoded. If priming only leads to assimilation effects,
then when a concept is activated (e.g., positive trait), it will lead to subsequent evaluations and
perceptions of relevant information that are congruent with the prime (e.g., evaluating
subsequent relevant stimuli positively; Higgins, Rholes, & Jones, 1997). Both assimilation and
contrast (i.e., incongruent evaluation) effects can occur due to priming. When participants are
unaware of a prime, they are more likely to interpret ambiguous behavioral information in a
congruent (i.e., assimilative) manner (Lombardi, Higgins, & Bargh, 1987). Conversely, those
who were aware of the prime were more likely to categorize actions in a way that was
incongruent with the trait prime (i.e., contrast effects). Higgins (1989) suggested that these
findings may have occurred because, when people are aware of the prime, the prime may act as a
sort of standard against which the other stimuli are judged. It may be less likely for the test
stimuli to meet this standard leading to contrasting effects.
1.2.2

Race and Stereotypes

During social categorization, social stimuli (i.e., people) are grouped together, as are the

attributes and characteristics (e.g., behaviors) associated with these social categories. Social
categories elicit category information, or stereotypes, that facilitate impression formation (Allport et
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al., 1954; Bargh, 1999; Devine, 1989; Dovidio et al., 1986; Fazio & Dunton, 1997; Freeman, Penner,
Saperstein, Scheutz, & Ambady, 2011; Gilbert & Hixon, 1991; Ramasubramanian, 2011; Sinclair &
Kunda, 1999). How people think about stimuli, whether as social entities or as objects, impacts

the type of category (and relevant stereotype) activation that occurs (Hugenberg, Sacco, &
Compass, 2008). Activating and applying social category information seemingly aids in
navigating a socially-complex world by allowing people to satisfice (Simon, 1945) using just
enough category information to meet our goals rather than considering all information, including
that which may be potentially irrelevant. Many theorists agree that social categorization and the
subsequent activation of stereotypes are unconditional phenomena, occurring even with the mere
presentation of a social target (see Bargh, 1999 for a review). Further, it is held that social
categorization, and subsequent stereotype activation, tends to occur most powerfully in situations
where the goals of the task require perceivers to think about others as social beings (Hugenberg
et al., 2008).
Alternatively, prototypes are considered to be the best-fit, or most central members, of a
category (Rosch, 1973; J. D. Smith, 2014). Consistent with research on representative heuristics
(Braga, Ferreira, & Sherman, 2015; Kahneman, 2011; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Wells,
1985), judgments and decisions made about potential members of a category are determined
based on how closely the members resemble or represent the central or idealized member of the
category (Rosch, 1975). Similar to stereotypes, there is a significant amount of literature
suggesting that certain facial features may be perceived as more prototypical of a particular racial
category than other facial features. To be clear, this is not to say that any feature or set of
features are inherent to any race. But rather, certain faces may be perceived to be more
prototypical of race than others and therefore may be most associated with the stereotypes linked
to that racial category compared to others. Blair (2002) suggests that African American faces
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perceived to be more prototypical (or stereotypical) of race are categorized more quickly as
being African American compared to faces with less-prototypical faces.
1.3

Judgment, Decision-Making
1.3.1

Spontaneous Trait Inferences

Social categories provide cognitive structures for organizing information. (Otten &
Moskowitz, 2000; Tajfel, Turner, Austin, & Worchel, 1979). Social categorization can facilitate
the automatic activation of the concepts associated with those categories. Although this process
leads to a variety of judgments and decisions (that go beyond the scope of this document), one
outcome is the positive or negative evaluations and expectations we have towards other groups,
which may bias subsequent information processing about those groups (Maass & Schaller, 1991;
Otten & Moskowitz, 2000). For example, Otten and Moskowitz (2000) investigated how a
minimal-groups paradigm would influence the types of spontaneous trait inferences participants
would make about their in-group vs. out-group. A minimal-groups paradigm organizes
participants into groups based on arbitrary criteria created by the experimenters (Tajfel, Billig,
Bundy, & Flament, 1971). Previous research suggests that this sort of paradigm activates ingroup favoritism that impacts subsequent judgment and decision-making (Brewer & Brown,
1998). Positive affect associated with an in-group, even if arbitrarily assigned, activates and
impacts subsequent implicit inferences and explicit behavior. This study illustrates how bias and
subsequent biased inferences can occur with a random, meaningless group assignment; however,
we find similar patterns when the groups do have prior meaning and are not so random (Allport
et al., 1954; Devine, 1989; Devine & Elliot, 1995; Dovidio et al., 1986).
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1.3.2

Stereotypes and Heuristics

People reply on heuristics to make quick (and yet efficient) decisions that maximize
optimal outcomes, particularly about uncertain events (Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011;
Kahneman & Frederick, 2005). Classic research conducted by Tversky and Kahneman (1974)
showed that the use of heuristics, or mental shortcuts, helps people quickly arrive at conclusions
by reducing the amount of cognitive processes that may otherwise be necessary to make
decisions and solve problems. Availability heuristics are based on the cognitive availability of
verifying information (Braga et al., 2015; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). People make decisions
via availability heuristics based on how readily available the information comes to mind.
Rothbart et al. (1978) suggested that stereotypes act via availability heuristic formation; the ease
with which people retrieve information (e.g., behaviors about social groups) influences how
prevalent they perceive the event, object or behaviors occur in the environment. The utilization
of stereotypes are often thought to be not only conscious, but also unconscious or automatic
processes (Fiske, 1993) and, thus, may influence both implicit and explicit judgments. These
processes aid individuals by filtering out and filling in information associated with the stereotype
to make decision-making more efficient, particularly in uncertain situations.
1.3.3

Stereotypes and Spontaneous Trait Inferences

From a cognitive perspective, stereotypes act as efficient cognitive tools that simplify the
social perception process (Bodenhausen & Wyer, 1985; Macrae et al., 1994). Instead of spending
time and energy attending to the specific and individual characteristics of people’s social
environment, people use stereotypes to form quick impressions and make judgments about others
(Brewer & Feinstein, 1999; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990). Stereotypes may be efficient inferential
tools that aid in forming impressions about the others in people’s social environments, without
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necessarily needing specific and individuating information beyond their social group
membership (Ramos, Garcia-Marques, Hamilton, Ferreira, & Van Acker, 2012).
Both stereotypes and spontaneous trait inferences aid in the coherence and
comprehension of information (Ramos et al., 2012). Drawing on the principle of coherence,
comprehension is the “construction of coherent representation” (p. 1248) of the information that
is provided in the environment. During the process of comprehension, people make inferences
that extend beyond the information that is explicitly given to create a coherent representation
(Ramos et al., 2012). Ramos and colleagues (2012) that inferences are more likely to occur when
they aid in the “coherent integration” (p. 1254) of previously learned stereotypical knowledge
and new behavioral information This integration process occurs due to the encoding process
outlined earlier (Wigboldus, Sherman, Franzese, and van Knippenberg (2004). To test this
integration process, Wigboldus and colleagues (2004) proposed that activating a particular
stereotype prior to encoding of behavioral information potentially makes stereotype-consistent
information more readily accessible and stereotype-inconsistent information less accessible. It
stands to reason that if the information is stereotype-consistent, this consistency should not
interfere with the spontaneous trait inferencing process because the implied trait just becomes
more easily accessed. Stereotype-inconsistent information should interfere with the spontaneous
inferencing process, however, because the mind is receiving and attempting to process two
competing pieces of information: a) the information that is received prior to encoding and b) the
inconsistent information at encoding. When this occurs, the activated stereotype is competing
with the trait that would have otherwise been implied from the behavioral information. This
process makes it is easier to reject a probe that is stereotype-inconsistent because that
information is not readily available. It is harder to reject stereotype-consistent probes because
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that information is readily available, and it is harder to determine whether that readily available
information is in fact present or not.
1.3.4

Race and Stereotypes

As mentioned, stereotypes are positive or negative beliefs held about a particular groups’
behavior and attributes (see review in Fiske, 1998). They can also be thought of as mental
representations for members of (typically social) groups (e.g., gender, race). Stereotypes are
often thought to be not only conscious, but also unconscious or automatic processes (Fiske,
1993). Although these processes aid individuals by filtering out and filling in information
associated with the stereotype to make decision-making as effortless as possible, these processes
do not, at times, come without (sometimes extreme) consequences. Racial stereotypes
consistently affect African Americans across many actions and behaviors, and generally in
negative ways. Participants report higher hosptily and violence for African American men
compared to White men (Duncan, 1976). They are also more likely to consider these hostile
behaviors to be attributed to dispositional character traits when the target person is an African
American male compared to a White male. Other less negative stereotypes (but not necessarily
less problematic, like the “athletic” stereotype) also seem to affect evaluative judgment and
decision-making. Stone, Perry, and Darley (1997) found that when participants listened to a
recording of a college basketball game, they rated players depicted as Black to have more
athletic ability compared to when players were depicted as White.
1.4

Memory
Tulving and Thompson (1973, p. 352) stated that “remembering is regarded as a joint

product of information stored in the past and information present in the immediate cognitive
environment of the rememberer.” Although experimenters have long known that memory
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includes some combination of 'acquisition, retention, transfer and inference of associations
between stimuli and responses' Tulving and Thompson (1973, p. 352) the intertwined and
seemingly co-dependent nature of these subsystems made them difficult to investigate prior to
the late 40s and early 50s (Tulving & Thomson, 1973; Endel Tulving & Osler, 1968). However,
a new way to investigate retrieval as a separate process emerged using what was called the
“extralist cueing effect.” The extralist cueing effect is the recall of a list item by a retrieval cue
that was not explicitly a part of the initial input list. The extralist cueing effect is a robust
empirical phenomenon (Bilodeau, 1967; Bilodeau & Blick, 1965; Fox, Blick, & Bilodeau, 1964;
McLeod, Williams, & Broadbent, 1971; Postman, Adams, & Phillips, 1955). For example,
McLeod, Williams and Broadbent (1971) showed participants a list of words followed by a
mental arithmetic task. Participants were then asked to recall the words that had been presented
earlier. After a brief two-minute delay, participants were then shown cues not previously
presented but related to the original list of words (extralist cue words). For example, if
participants saw the list bed, pillow and blanket, they may receive a nonpresented but related cue
word like sleep. They then received the same instructions, to recall as many words as possible
from the originally presented list. For words still not recalled from the original list, participants
received a second cue word. Similar to previous findings (Endel Tulving & Osler, 1968), the
results suggested that one cue assisted in stimulus word recall and the second cue produced even
further recall.
Tulving and Thomson (1973) concluded that the effectiveness of extralist cues can best
be explained by what is now known as the encoding specificity principle (Tulving & Thomson,
1973). Broadly, this principle states that the effectiveness of retrieval largely depends on the
contextual information that is stored with the word in episodic memory; the more the external
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contextual information at retrieval matches the external contextual information at encoding, the
more effective retrieval is generally indexed by accuracy and level of detail recalled. For
example, the word VIOLET may typically be encoded and stored as a color name and would not
be retrieved well if cued with an instance of the category of flower or girls’ names. According to
the encoding specificity principle (Tulving & Thomson, 1973), effective retrieval of the word in
response to such cues would be likely to occur only if the contextual information at encoding
also suggested the word VIOLET to be a girl’s name or a flower (see below section for further
information on categorical knowledge).
1.4.1

Spontaneous Trait Inferences

It is debated to this day whether, or the degree to which, encoding versus retrieval plays a
role in the inferencing process at test. A retrieval explanation would suggest that there is a
preexisting association in semantic memory between the cue and the to-be-remembered material.
When the cue is presented, the to-be-remembered information is brought to the forefront of the
mind (Uleman, 1987). An encoding explanation would suggest that an association is established
in episodic memory between the cue and the to-be-remembered material. In this instance, the cue
does not need to be present at encoding, but simply inferred. When the inferred cue is presented
explicitly for the first time at test, the newly established association between the cue and the tobe-remembered material in episodic memory leads to recall.
Is spontaneous trait inferencing better explained from an encoding or from a retrieval
perspective? That is, is the trait spontaneously generated when information is encoded for
subsequent memory, or does retrieval of information result in spontaneous trait inferences?
Uleman et al. (1992) probed this question by manipulating the amount of cognitive resources
available to people (i.e., cognitive load). Participants saw a number series varying in difficulty
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(i.e., all the same numbers in a digit string versus different numbers in a digit string), one number
at a time. Participants then saw a distractor sentence followed by a black slide where they were
to recall the digit sequence they saw earlier. Simultaneously, participants monitored a signal light
and were asked to press a response key when it lit up (further taxing resources available). The
main results showed that disposition (trait) cues under low cognitive load (i.e., simple digit
string) were more effective for recalling sentences compared to no cues. There was no significant
difference under high load (i.e., the multiple-digit condition). Taken together, these results
suggest that the effectiveness of cued recall is moderated by the level of available cognitive
resources. These results (a) further support the argument against considering spontaneous trait
inferencing an automatic process and (b) support the encoding explanation of spontaneous trait
inferencing. Decreasing the amount of cognitive resources available directly interferes with
making and encoding trait inferences. If disposition (trait) cued recall depends primarily on
retrieval processes, there would be no difference between digit conditions, because the retrieval
conditions and materials were the same for all participants in the study. Participants unloaded
any material they were asked to remember before the test. Only the encoding conditions were
manipulated; therefore, they are the main process involved in trait inferencing.
1.4.2

Race and Stereotypes

Schemas can generally be defined as categories people have theories about based on
previous knowledge or experience that function as a framework of knowledge to help people
better understand their environment (D. J. Schneider, 2005; Tse et al., 2007). Schemas aid in the
encoding into and retrieval from memory. People tend to remember and understand information
better when a relevant schema is salient. Because stereotypes act as a type of schema, people
seem to show differences in the information that is remembered based on the stereotype that has
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been made salient. Pittinsky, Shih, and Ambady (2000) found that when perceivers are primed to
think of an Asian woman as a “female” (often stereotyped as having a deficit in mathematical
ability), they remember lower SAT scores than when they are primed to think of her as “Asian”
(often stereotyped as having exceptional mathematical ability). Although schemas (and
stereotypes) seem to facilitate remembering for accurate information, they also seem to facilitate
memory for inaccurate information. People tend falsely to remember schema-relevant
information being presented that was actually never presented (Lenton, Blair, & Hastie, 2001;
Sherman & Bessenoff, 1999). For example, people with strong gender stereotypes seem to
remember gender-consistent information being presented (Stangor, 1988) and sometimes
misremember the gender of the target presented in a scene when the scene involves genderincongruent activities (Signorella & Liben, 1984). Stereotypes also seem to act as a type of
source-monitoring cue for memory (Sherman & Bessenoff, 1999). Source-monitoring processes
are particularly needed when it is difficult to make sense of the information provided (Jacoby,
Woloshyn, & Kelley, 1989). Because stereotypes seem also to be evoked when cognitive
resources are particularly low, they may be more likely to be attributed to the target individual,
event, or object resulting in either an accurate or inaccurate remembering of the source of the
memory.
Police line-ups and eyewitness testimony research illustrate some of the gravest
implications of cognitive processing and memory encoding errors from stereotypical
expectations. The Innocence Project (2013) indicated that Black men accounted for more than
60% of overturned convictions due to advancements in DNA identification. Memory is
dependent on a witness’s ability accurately to associate a behavior with a source target and thus,
to correctly attribute criminal behavior to the criminal (Sherman & Bessenoff, 1999). These
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types of critical source-monitoring tasks can be complicated by the stereotypical expectations
that may bias the perceiver (see Hamilton & Sherman, 1994, for a review). Race, sex, age, or
dress are all cues with associated stereotypes that may lead perceivers to be more or less likely to
identify the source target of the criminal behavior accurately. Eyewitness identification error is
the leading cause of wrongful convictions (The Innocence Project, 2013). Previous literature has
found that Black men are falsely identified in simultaneous line ups more so than White men
(Vitriol, Appleby, & Borgida, 2019). Further, Knuycky, Kleider, and Cavrak (2014a) found that
Black men with stereotypical features were more likely falsely identified compared to Black men
with nonstereotypical features. Taken together, these findings suggest that the degree to which a
target is associated with a negative stereotype impacts the degree to which that stereotype may
act as a source-monitoring cue for later retrieval.
1.5

Individual Differences in Spontaneous Trait Inferencing
Studies have shown that differences in power (e.g., societal status) impact the way people

make inferences (Goodwin, Gubin, Fiske, & Yzerbyt, 2000; Wang & Yang, 2017). Although
these studies did not directly investigate race/ethnicity or gender, it is possible that certain groups
that are historically associated with relatively high systemic and societal power may elicit
different trait inferences compared to those that are not. Other research has suggested that
personality traits like idocentrism versus allocentrism impact the type of inferences that people
make. Like power, certain race/ethnic groups may be perceived to be more idiocentric compared
to allocentric and this perception may influence the type of spontaneous inferences that people
make about those groups.
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1.5.1

Powers

Power is defined as the degree to which one can alter another person’s state by providing
or withholding resources and eliciting consequences/punishments (Emerson, 1962; Keltner,
Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003; Wang & Yang, 2017). Power influences the degree to which
people rely on stereotypes when forming social perceptions (Fiske, 1993; Fiske & Dépret, 1996;
Goodwin et al., 2000; Keltner et al., 2003; Willis & Guinote, 2011). High-power people tend to
live in environments with an abundance of resources, and they therefore may process social
events quickly because they are less likely to be motivated to care about the consequences of
faulty perceptions (Wang & Yang, 2017). Further, because high-power people have an
abundance of resources, they may be more selective in the way they allocate their cognitive
resources. Low-powered people have less available resources and are subject to more threats and
punishment from the social environment compared to high-powered people (Domhoff, 1998;
French & Raven, 1959; Weber, 1947, as cited by Wang & Yang, 2017). Keltner and colleagues
(2003) suggest that low-power people may be more effortful and deliberate when interpreting
social behaviors in an attempt to increase the odds of positive outcomes.
The power and cognition literature proposes that power may impact the degree to which
people make judgments and decisions that are consistent with a stereotype when stereotypical
information is readily available (and applicable to the situation; Wang & Yang, 2017; Willis &
Ginote, 2011). Powerful individuals attend more to stereotype-consistent information compared
to stereotype-inconsistent information (Goodwin et al., 2000); they tend to view people that
perform stereotype-consistent roles as more suitable for jobs than people that perform stereotypeinconsistent roles (Guinote & Phillips, 2010); and they respond faster to stereotype-consistent
than stereotype-inconsistent words after viewing photographs of Black and White individuals
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(Guinote, 2010). Low-power people do not show those differences which suggests that power
may influence the degree to which people display stereotypical biases (Wang & Yang, 2017).
For example, participants in a study by Wang and Yang (2017) were shown either a high-power
word prime (e.g., control, dominant) or low-power primes (e.g., submit, comply). Participants
were then shown elderly stereotype-consistent and stereotype-inconsistent sentences followed by
a corresponding trait probe. Consistent with previous research, participants took more time
correctly to reject probes following elderly stereotype-consistent sentences than following
control sentences. However, this effect only occurred for the high-powered individuals. There
was no difference in response time for low-powered individuals suggesting that high-powered
individuals were more susceptible to making spontaneous trait inferences from elderly-consistent
sentences but not stereotype-inconsistent sentences.
1.5.2

Idiocentricism vs Allocentrism

Cross-cultural research suggests certain global regions tend operate as more individualist
cultures, where people’s behaviors are generally guided by personal goals. Other regions are
more strongly defined by collectivistic cultures, where people’s behaviors are guided by group or
communal goals (Triandis, 1990). Miller and colleagues suggest that individualist culture are
more likely to describe others in terms of their perceived personality trait terms compared with
collectivistic culture (Miller, 1984, 1987). Additionally, people within individualistic cultures are
more likely to view individuals as autonomous entities whose behaviors are a consequence of
internal characteristics, attributes, and traits (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). During the
categorization process, people in individualistic cultures may be more likely to make
dispositional trait inferences and less likely to adjust these inferences even with additional
situational context to contrary. People from collectivistic cultures, however, may be less likely to
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focus on dispositional interpretations and thus, more likely to consider situational information
when interpreting the behavior of others (Nisbett, 2004).
Newman (1993) investigated how idiocentrism and allocentrism impacted trait
inferencing. Similar to certain cultures being more individualistic compared to collectivistic,
individual personalities differ in idiocentrism compared to allocentrism (Triandis, Leung,
Villareal, & Clack, 1985). People from individualist cultures are more likely to be more
idiocentric, focusing on things like personal achievement. In contrast, people from collectivistic
cultures are more likely to be more allocentric, focusing on things like family and social groups
(Triandis, 1990). Newman (1993) proposed that people high in idiocentrism would are more
likely to interpret behaviors in dispositional, trait terms, whereas those low in idiocentrism would
be more likely to consider situational information. Newman measured a group of men’s
idiocentrism and then showed them behavioral sentences. After a delay, the men were asked to
recall sentences following a personality trait cue. Newman found that the men who were high in
idiocentrism were more likely spontaneously to interpret behavior in trait terms compared with
the men who were low in idiocentrism.
In sum, when reviewing some of the literature surrounding attention,
knowledge/categorization, memory and judgment and decision-making relevant to spontaneous
trait inferences to this point, a few key points seem to emerge. Spontaneous trait inferences seem
to fall on an automatic to controlled spectrum where people tend to be unaware of making these
inferences, but they can control them under certain conditions (e.g., when instructed or motivated
to do so). Previous knowledge, particularly knowledge that has been primed impacts spontaneous
trait inferences. Further, the way information is encoded impacts the types of retrieval cues that
are most effective in retrieval stored information. When stereotypical information is encoded
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with behavioral information, these stereotypes may act as a retrieval cue, even if specific
stereotypical information is not explicitly presented. Finally, individuals and groups demonstrate
more spontaneous trait inferencing than other based on individual differences. In Chapter 2, the
literature on spontaneous trait inferences by White adult populations will be discussed.
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2

SPONTANEOUS TRAIT INFERENCES: Race, Face-type, and Stereotypes
What is one of the main concerns most people have when interviewing for a new job or

meeting a partner’s family for the first time? Odds are that they are most preoccupied with
making a good first impression. Impression formation research (Gilbert, 1998) involves the
investigation of ways in which people form quick evaluations about others and their behaviors.
One way quick evaluations are made is via the trait inferences that are drawn from these
behaviors (Uleman, Newman, & Moskowitz, 1996). Research on spontaneous trait inferences
has largely focused on the specific behaviors and the nondescript actors performing those
behaviors, However, in everyday life, there is much more available and observable
information—like gender, age, and skin tone–all of which are salient features people use to
categorize others quickly and efficiently (Fiske, 1998). Once people are categorized, automatic
attributes and characteristics (e.g., stereotypes) associated with the category may be applied to
that specific actor or group member. The purpose of this present research is to investigate the
combined effects of stereotypical knowledge associated with group membership (i.e., race) and
the inferences people make when this knowledge potentially competes with presented behavioral
information.
2.1

Spontaneous Trait Inferences: What are they and how do they occur?
As was detailed in Chapter 1, spontaneous trait inferences occur when an inference is

drawn from another person’s behavior, typically without any intention of forming some sort of
impression about that person (Uleman, Adil Saribay, & Gonzalez, 2008). Spontaneous trait
inferences are considered to be “spontaneous” because they occur quickly (Todd, Molden, Ham,
& Vonk, 2011), generally without intention or awareness (Orghian, Ramos, Garcia-Marques, &
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Uleman, 2019; Winter & Uleman, 1984), and are highly efficient but not uncontrollable
(Crawford, Skowronski, Stiff, & Scherer, 2007).
The most compelling evidence for spontaneous trait inferences is supported by a cuedrecall procedure that is based on Tulving and Thomson’s (1973) principle of encoding
specificity. This principle states that “specific encoding operations performed on what is
perceived determine what is stored, and what is stored determines what retrieval cues are
effective in providing access to what is stored” (Tulving & Thomson, 1973, p. 369). More recent
studies have utilized using an “online” recognition probe paradigm (McKoon & Ratcliff, 1986;
Uleman, Hon, Roman, & Moskowitz, 1996) wherein participants are shown trait-implying
sentences along with control or filler sentences followed by a probe word. Participants are asked
to indicate as quickly and accurately as possible whether the probe word was presented in the
previous sentence. For experimental trials, the probe word is a trait word that is implied in the
previously presented sentence (e.g., the girl hit the teacher, followed by the word aggressive”).
These trait probe words, however, may serve multiple roles: to imply certain behaviors, and to
imply characteristics about one’s group membership (i.e., stereotypes).
Spontaneous trait inferences can occur with little to no awareness or conscious attention.
In one study, participants were shown sentences and then distracted before being asked to recall
the sentences they had seen previously (Winter & Uleman, 1984). Some participants saw
relevant trait cues that were implied from the previously shown sentences whereas other
participants saw irrelevant cues. Participants who received relevant trait cues recalled sentences
better at test than those who did not receive trait cues. This occurred even when participants
received no instruction to infer traits or form impressions about the targets in the sentences. In
the same study, participants were asked open-ended questions to participants regarding the
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strategies they may have used to remember sentences presented to them. Any mention of traits,
impression formation, or personality was treated as awareness of using some sort of trait
inferencing strategy. The experimenters also asked participants whether they used any visual
strategies or word associations; participants had no conscious awareness of using any memory
strategies during encoding or retrieval of the presented sentences. Winter et al. (1985) conducted
a similar procedure but presented sentences to participants as the distractor task. Again, trait cues
resulted in significantly better recall of these sentences compared to no cues and other types of
cues (e.g., gist cues, semantic cues). Winter et al. (1985) also tested the possibility that, in
previous studies, participants may have had a fleeting awareness of having made some sort of
inference that was quickly lost by the time awareness was assessed. That is, assuming that an
inference was made, did participants have awareness of that inference at any point in time even if
they did not have awareness of them at test? Participants were asked similar strategy-use
questions, but this time, immediately after being asked to repeat the sentence aloud.
However, spontaneous trait inferences also seem to fall on a spectrum of automaticity
such that although they do show characteristics of automatic processes, there also seem to be
controlled characteristics. Uleman and colleagues (1992) showed participants a number series
(varying in difficulty) one digit at a time. Participants then saw a distractor sentence (the trait
inferring behavioral sentence) and then were asked to recall the digit series they saw earlier. The
results suggested that trait cues were less effective for sentence recall in participants who
memorized the more difficult digit series (high load) compared to participants who memorized
simple digit series (low load). These findings suggest that a concurrent cognitive load task
interfered with making trait inferences, thus, undermining the assumption that trait inferences are
automatic.
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Priming also impacts the way spontaneous trait inferences occur both in an assimilative
and a contrasting manner. Newman and Uleman (1990) primed participants with trait concepts
followed by ambiguous behavioral sentences. If the behavior is spontaneously interpreted and
encoded in congruence with the activated category (assimilation effect), then it should also
follow that a trait retrieval cue congruent with the primed concept would be a better recall cue
than a trait concept that is incongruent with the primed concept. Conversely, the experimenters
also hypothesized that if the results are in line with alternate literature showing assimilation and
contrast effects, together, then the above hypothesis should only hold when people are not
consciously aware of the prime. Similar to previous studies, participants were shown a prime that
was presented either above or below the threshold of what is considered to be conscious
awareness. Participants were then shown ambiguous sentences followed by a trait cue (that was
either congruent or incongruent with a later presented cue). When participants could not
remember the prime they were shown, they generally demonstrated better sentence recall for
congruent prime and cue meaning pairs (assimilation effects). Incongruent pairs elicited better
recall when participants could remember the prime. This suggests that whether or not a trait
concept has been recently activated via priming and how aware subjects are of the activation
may be critical factors in predicting the likelihood of the trait being spontaneously inferred.
Further, the type of priming (i.e., race versus gender prime) and the way in which a category is
made accessible impacts the types of traits we infer and potentially the sort judgments we make.
Spontaneous trait inferences are also impacted by the depth of encoding processes.
Uleman et al. (1993) illustrated the involvement of encoding versus retrieval by manipulating the
depth of encoding processing. Levels of processing theory (Craik & Lockhart, 1972) suggests
that the degree to which a stimulus is processed depends on attention, meaning, and connections
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to other information that stimulus may have. Shallow processing may result in poor memory for
the stimulus, whereas deep processing generally results in better memory for the stimulus (Craik
& Lockhart, 1972). By using various photographic primes (see categorical knowledge section for
priming review) accompanied with behavioral sentences, Uleman and colleagues (1993) sought
to manipulate the elaboration and depth of processing. The experimenters showed participants
behavioral sentences paired with a photograph of the actor (i.e., face), a setting (i.e., landscape),
or something abstract (i.e., a pattern). After a brief distraction, half of the participants were
shown the initial photograph again, whereas the other participants were not and were asked to
recall as much of the initial sentence as possible. They found that actor photographs at encoding
did facilitate better recall of behaviors compared to settings and patterns. This suggests two
things. First, inferences may refer to the actor in a behavioral sentence possibly more than the
behavior itself. Second, because faces likely convey more meaning and establish more
connections compared to landscapes and patterns, the face-behavioral sentence pairs likely
resulted in more elaborative encoding than setting and abstract pairs. This provides further
evidence for an encoding explanation compared to a retrieval explanation of spontaneous trait
inferencing. This is not to completely diminish the role retrieval plays in spontaneous trait
inferencing process. When behavioral sentences are recalled, they are retrieved from memory in
some manner; taken together, these findings suggest that the inference occurs at encoding and
later aids in retrieval. Retrieval is efficient to the degree that the initial encoding was efficient.
2.2

Race, Face-type, and Stereotypes
During categorization, prototypes are the idealized, best-fit, or most central members of a

concept (Rosch, 1973). From this perspective, judgments and decisions made about potential
members of a category are determined based on how closely they resemble or represent the
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prototype (Rosch, 1975; J. D. Smith & Minda, 2001). This would be true for social
categorization as well. Certain faces may be perceived to be more prototypical of their racial
group than other faces within that same racial group, and certainly more so than faces outside of
that racial group. For example, Black men may be categorized on the basis of the degree to
which they possess stereotypically Black facial features, such as some combination of darker
skin, broad nose, and full lips, wide-set eyes (Blair, Judd, & Chapleau, 2004; Blair, Judd, Sadler,
& Jenkins, 2002; Blair, Judd, & Fallman, 2004; Bond, 2016; Eberhardt, Goff, Purdie, & Davies,
2004; Knuycky, Kleider, Cavrak, 2014). It follows that prototypical faces within race may be
considered most representative of that race, therefore more likely to be subjected to judgment
and categorization via the stereotypes typically associated with that social racial category. Again,
this is not to say that any specific feature or set of features are inherent to any particular race but
rather, because of historical context, certain facial features or combinations of features may be
associated with certain racial categories more so than others.
For example, Kleider and colleagues (2012) found the encoding process of prototypical
faces may lead to a face-source memory error. Because these faces are the most representative of
a category, and the category’s respective stereotypes, it may be more difficult to remember the
contextual information with which the face was originally encoded, especially when the original
context was incongruent with the stereotype of the category. Kleider and colleagues (2012)
showed participants panels of faces paired with a role label that was either positive (e.g., artist)
or negative (e.g., drug dealer). After completing a distractor task for twenty minutes, participants
were shown the previously viewed faces individually and were asked to categorize the faces into
their original roles. Stereotypical faces were more likely to be accurately categorized into
negative roles compared to positive roles. Further, when participants did miscategorize faces,
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they were more likely to miscategorize stereotypical faces into negative roles compared to
positive roles. Extending these findings, Bond, Washburn, and Kleider‐Offutt (2021) found that
when using a similar paradigm with Black children’s faces, similar results would found. Children
with stereotypical faces were more likely to be miscategorized into negative roles compared to
positive roles. Further, people were more like to increase the level of discipline for schoolhouse
infractions when the child had a stereotypical face rather than a nonstereotypical face. These
findings further support the idea that faces most representative of a category are most likely to be
associated with the stereotypes linked to the category, and the faces least representative of a
category are least likely to be associated with these stereotypes.
Neurological evidence converges well with behavioral evidence suggesting that people pay
selective attention to Black faces compared to White faces. When shown pictures of African
Americans and White individuals, fMRI research shows that multiple areas of the brain (i.e.,
amygdala, midbrain, hippocampus) were all more active for African American faces than for
White faces (Lieberman et al., 2005). Examining event-related potential responses, Ito and
Urland (2005) found that when participants were shown pictures of Black and White males and
making race-irrelevant decisions, Black male targets elicited a larger positive-going P200 signal,
which has also been found to respond differentially to threatening images (e.g., fierce dogs). In a
follow-up study using a dot-probe detection paradigm, Trawalter, Todd, Baird, and Richeson
(2008) found that when Black faces were presented briefly (30-ms), they captured attention
differentially (indexed by shorter reaction time latencies) compared to White faces.
2.3

Stereotypes and Spontaneous Trait Inferences
Stereotypes may interfere with the spontaneous inferencing process. Although limited,

research in this area has provided some answers on the role that spontaneous trait inferences play
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in how stereotypes impact the initial stages of information processing, during the encoding of
social behavior, and in a social context. Wigboldus et al. (2003) suggested stereotypical trait
inhibition or facilitation may either hinder or foster the spontaneous trait inferencing process.
The experimenters proposed that activating a particular stereotype, prior to encoding behavioral
information, makes stereotype-consistent information more readily accessible and stereotypeinconsistent information less accessible. If the information is stereotype-consistent, this should
not interfere with the spontaneous trait inferencing process because the implied trait just
becomes more easily accessed. However, stereotype-inconsistent information should interfere
with the spontaneous inferencing process because essentially the mind is receiving two different
messages: (1) information prior to encoding, and (2) inconsistent information at encoding. In this
case, the activated stereotype is competing with the trait that would have otherwise been implied
from the behavioral information.
In two studies, participants read behavioral sentences or phrases accompanied with a
label that was either stereotype-consistent or stereotype-inconsistent with the behavioral sentence
(Ramos et al., 2012). For example, the behavioral sentence “asked where the stars came from”
would be shown. This sentence implies the trait curious. This behavioral sentence was
accompanied with a category label that was either stereotypically consistent (e.g., the best
student), or inconsistent (e.g., the most popular student) with the behavioral sentence. To
understand the degree to which people make spontaneous trait inference and spontaneous
situational inferences, the researchers also added additional situational sentences (e.g., “this
being one of the homework questions”), which implied situational inference (e.g., duty). After
viewing the sentence, participants then saw a relevant probe word (e.g., curious, duty) and were
asked to indicate as quickly and accurately as possible whether the probe word was mentioned in
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the previous sentence. Participants made more errors for trait probes in the stereotype
inconsistent condition compared to the stereotype consistent condition. This supports the
hypothesis that spontaneous trait inferences are less likely to occur when the stereotype is
consistent with the behavior compared to inconsistent. Participants were more likely correctly to
indicate that an implied trait was presented in the prior behavioral sentence when the behavior
was performed by a member of a group wherein the behavior is stereotypically inconsistent than
when the behavior was performed a stereotype-consistent group member.
Wigboldus and colleagues (2003) found similar results as Ramos and colleagues (2012)
when they investigated how stereotypical information, presented both with conscious awareness
and below the threshold of conscious awareness, influenced spontaneous trait inferencing.
Wigboldus et al. (2003) presented an actor along with a behavioral sentence that illustrated either
stereotype-consistent or stereotype-inconsistent behavioral pairs. When the behaviors were
stereotype-inconsistent, participants took less time to make accurate responses indicating
inhibition of stereotype trait inferencing. They found similar results even when stereotype labels
were presented briefly and considered to be below the threshold of conscious awareness.
Because stereotype-inconsistent information leads to weak spontaneous trait inferences, it is
much easier for participants to indicate that the probe word was not in the prior sentence. These
results suggest that stereotypes interfere with the stereotype inferencing process when the
information is stereotype-inconsistent. Further, Wigboldus, Sherman, Franzese, and van
Knippenberg (2004) found that under high cognitive load conditions, spontaneous trait
inferences were less likely for stereotype–inconsistent than stereotype–consistent behaviors.
However, there were no differences under low load suggesting that stereotypes are especially
likely to affect spontaneous trait inferencing when cognitive resources are at a deficit.
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Similar to Wigboldus et al. (2003), Stewart, Weeks, and Lupfer (2003) also investigated
the degree to which stereotypes may impact spontaneous trait inferences but specifically focused
on positive and negative racial stereotypes. Stewart et al. (2003) showed participants pictures of
either Black or White individuals paired with a behavioral sentence. Participants saw sentences
that were indicative of both positive and negative traits that had be pre-rated as being stereotypic
of African American men: athletic, funny, musical, lazy, promiscuous, unintelligent, and
criminal (Stewart et al., 1998). Participants also completed a survey as an index for individual
differences in prejudice level. High-prejudice participants compared to low-prejudice
participants were expected to make spontaneous trait inferences about African American
stereotypic behaviors and therefore would be more likely inaccurately to indicate that they had
seen a African American stereotypic trait implying word when the behavior sentence was paired
with Black male target compared to a White male target. However, the results indicated that
people made these expected spontaneous trait inferences regardless of prejudice level.
Regardless of prejudice level, participants were more likely inaccurately to indicate that they had
seen a African American stereotypic trait implying word when the behavior sentence was paired
with Black male target compared to a White male target. Taken together, Wigboldus et al. (2003)
investigated how category labels and their associated stereotypes may impact spontaneous trait
inferences whereas Stewart et al. (2003) investigated more specifically how racial stereotypes
may impact spontaneous trait inference and subsequent memory for implied words. However, no
previous study has investigated how stereotypes may be associated with certain faces within race
compared to others and how this distinction may also impact memory for trait-implying words.
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3.1

METHODOLOGY

General Method and Hypotheses
Using a recognition probe paradigm (McKoon & Ratcliff, 1986), the present research is

intended to extend the research conducted by Wigboldus et al. (2003) by investigating (1) how
racial stereotypes may impact the spontaneous trait inferences process, and (2) the degree to
which how a person represents a racial stereotype may impact spontaneous trait inferencing. If a
face only moderately represents a particular racial category, will there be weaker spontaneous
trait inferences compared to when faces that are perceived to be highly representative of a
particular racial category? In this study, participants read sentences, paired with a face that was
either prototypical or nonprototypical, and that was followed by probe words. Participants were
asked to indicate as quickly and accurately as possible whether these probe words were a part of
the preceding sentence.
I hypothesized stronger spontaneous trait inferences and, thus, slower and less accurate
responses to relevant trait probes when the behavior in the preceding sentence was stereotype
consistent with the face-type presented, compared to when this behavior was stereotype
inconsistent. I hypothesized that for stereotype-congruent behavioral information, people would
make spontaneous trait inferences that made it harder to indicate quickly whether the trait probes
were actually present or not in the preceding sentence. Increased ease of access of stereotype
consistent information should elicit the inference of stereotypical information that was never
presented, which would interfere with the ability accurately to recognize a subsequent trait probe
(whether it was presented or not). However, when the behavior is inconsistent with the activated
stereotype, the increased accessibility of behavior-inconsistent traits and decreased accessibility
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of behavior-consistent traits are likely to interfere with the spontaneous trait inferencing process,
making it easier to recognize whether or not a subsequent trait probe had been presented.
An alternative explanation for these potential findings is that the difference in RTs
between stereotype-congruent and stereotype incongruent sentences may be due solely to
stereotype activation and not to the biased spontaneous trait encoding process outlined above.
The presentation of the face may automatically activate a relevant trait (e.g., Devine, 1989;
Dijksterhuis & van Knippenberg, 1996), potentially making it harder for participants
subsequently to indicate that the trait probe was not in the sentence. In other words, would
participants spontaneously infer the trait “smart” on the basis of the sentence “The professor
wins the science quiz,” or would the activation of the stereotype of “professors” lead to the
automatic activation of this trait? For this reason, I also included trials with neutral behavioral
sentences to address the issue of trait inference merely due to stereotype activation explicitly. To
check for stereotype activation effects, participants responded to stereotype-neutral sentences
that were followed by trait probes that might be activated based on the face-type presented with
these sentences (e.g., athletic [fun]). Stereotype-neutral sentences should still lead to trait
activation and the effects should still be just as strong as the stereotype-congruent sentences.
However, I expected that stereotypical trait activation based on face-type alone would not lead to
the same probe-response interference process as for the spontaneous trait inferences based on
stereotype-congruent behavior.
Although a face-type may activate stereotype-congruent traits, such traits may be less
likely to be associated with the content of the neutral behavior because the stereotypical traits
that are activated play little role in the interpretation of the behavior. Because of this, the
confusion of whether the trait was in the sentence or not is less likely to occur. Therefore, I
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predicted that participants would respond more slowly to relevant trait probes when the behavior
in the preceding sentence was stereotype congruent with the face-type presented than when the
behavior is stereotype neutral with respect to the face-type presented. I also expected that
participants would respond more slowly to relevant trait probes when the behavior in the
preceding sentence is stereotype congruent with the face-type presented than when the behavior
is stereotype-incongruent. If however, trait activation by face-type alone is playing a larger role,
I expected the latencies to probes following stereotype-congruent and stereotype-neutral
sentences to be similar. NOTE: I had no priori expectation about probe word/face-type
congruency, only congruency between face-type and behavior sentences. That is not to say that
this is not a valuable research question but rather that such exploratory analyses extend beyond
the scope of this present research. In summary, I expected participants to take longer to indicate
whether a trait probe was part of the previous sentence when the sentence is stereotype congruent
compared to incongruent/neutral with the face (Experiment 1) when the photo prime is presented
before the behavioral sentence and not after (Experiment 2 and 3).
3.2

Recruitment
Due to restrictions necessary to comply with COVID-related procedures, all experiments

were performed on Qualtrics and all participants were recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk.
Participants were compensated $2.00 for approximately 1 hour of participation. All participants
were required to be above the age of 18, fluent in the English language and residing in the United
States to participate. In this study, all participants read sentences, paired with a face that was
either prototypical or nonprototypical, and that was followed by probe words. Participants were
asked to indicate as quickly and accurately as possible whether these probe words were a part of
the preceding sentence. All participants also answered demographic questions related to age,
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race, gender, ethnicity, political affiliation, political attitudes, mathematical ability, household
income, location and education level (the latter seven variables not analyzed for this
dissertation).
3.3

Experiment 1
3.3.1

Participants

The sample included 33 White participants and 13 non-White participants (14 female, 32
male). The majority of participants (n = 29) were 25-35 years of age (6 = 18-25 years of age; 10
= 35-65; 1 = did not report).
3.3.2

Materials

Face Stimuli. Twelve photos, pre-rated (Ma, Correll, & Wittenbrink, 2015) as African
American, were selected for the following experiments (stereotypical, M = 4.41;
nonstereotypical, M = 2.08; on a 5-point Likert scale).
Sentence and Probe Stimuli. Six pre-rated sentence and probe stimuli (Stewart et al.,
2003) were selected for the following experiments. Each sentence was considered to be
significantly stereotypical of African Americans. Six pre-rated neutral sentences and probe
stimuli were also selected for the following experiments (Wigboldus et al., 2003). NOTE:
Therefore, it follows that stereotypical faces would be considered consistent when paired with
stereotypical sentences and nonstereotypical faces would be considered inconsistent when paired
with stereotypical sentences. See the Appendices for the sentence stimuli that were used.
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3.3.3

Procedures

3.3.3.1 Experimental Trials
Six trait-implying sentences along with six neutral sentences were used. Each sentence
was paired with one face-type (stereotypical or nonstereotypical). Stereotype consistency was
manipulated by varying the face-type (stereotypical or nonstereotypical) resulting in 24 sentenceface pairs. To manipulate the probe type (and eliminate each response from being “no”), each
sentence was randomly be followed by a trait-implying probe or a literal repetition of the verb in
the behavioral sentence resulting in 48 experimental sentence-face pairs. Participants saw each of
these combinations twice resulting in 96 experimental trials total per participant. Note, however,
that trait probes following stereotype-neutral sentences consisted of the same traits as would be
used for the stereotype-consistent sentences for each target. Thus, the neutral behavioral sentence
“The man [nonstereotypical face] walks through town” may have been followed by the trait
probe fun, whereas the neutral behavioral sentence “The man [stereotypical face] walks through
town” may have been followed by the trait probe athletic. This was to test the extent to which
face-type may elicit stereotype congruent trait activation despite the use of neutral behaviors.
3.3.3.2 Filler Trials
Finally, 120 filler sentences that were not followed by a probe word were added, and
randomly interspersed with the 96 probe-word trials. This was done to prevent participants from
predicting when a probe word would appear (see, for a similar procedure, McKoon & Ratcliff,
1986; Uleman, Hon, et al., 1996). Filler sentences described the same kind of behaviors and
actors as the experimental sentences, to prevent participants from learning to discriminate
between sentences that were followed by a probe and sentences that are not. Thus, each
participant completed a total of 216 trials in Experiment 1.
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3.3.4

Procedures

The study was conducted on participants’ personal computing devices. To ensure
participants attended to the face presented, they were told to remember the actor that performed
the behavioral sentence. After participants consenting to the experiment via button click, they
were provided a brief explanation of the task. They were shown an example of a face, behavioral
sentence and probe word. They were instructed to press “A” on the keyboard if the probe word
was shown in the behavioral sentence just presented and to press “L” on the keyboard if it was
not. Before the actual experiment, participants had two practice blocks of trials. For the first
practice, participants read short sentences that appeared in the center of the screen, each for
2,000 ms. After a blank screen for 500 ms, a probe word appeared in the center of the screen.
The participants’ task was to indicate, as quickly and accurately as possible, whether the probe
word was present in the preceding sentence. Participants then saw a blank screen for 1,000 ms
before proceeding to the next sentence. The first practice round consisted of 10 trials. For the
second practice round, participants were asked to perform the same task; however, in this round
the sentences also were accompanied by photos of faces. After the two practice rounds,
participants completed the experimental trials.
Participants were presented with sentences randomly paired with a face (prototypical or
non-prototypical). Both the face and the behavioral sentence appeared on the screen
simultaneously for 2,000 ms. Next, participants saw a probe word. They were asked to indicate
as quickly and accurately as possible whether each probe word was a part of the preceding
sentence. Similar to the procedures conducted by Wigboldus et al. (2003), participants completed
96 experimental trials with a probe word interspersed randomly with 120 filler trials. On these
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filler trials participants saw the same experimental and neutral sentences but without probe
words. No action was required of participants for filler trials.
Trials were administered in six blocks, each block consisting of 16 probe-word trials and
20 trials without a probe word, in random order. Participants completed one block, took a 15s
break, and then proceed to the next block until all six blocks (216 total trials) were completed.
Block order was counterbalanced and randomized across participants.
3.4

Experiment 2
In Study 2, I presented participants with behavioral sentences in which the actor was

described with the letter X (e.g., “X wins the science quiz”). However, unlike Experiment 1, in
which participants saw face/behavior-sentence pairs simultaneously, in Experiment 2 the faces
and sentences were presented sequentially and in different orders. On some trials, participants
saw a prime picture of a face presented prior to the presentation of the sentence. As in
Experiment 1, that face could either be stereotype congruent, stereotype incongruent, or
stereotype neutral with respect to the behavior presented in the sentence. On other trials, the
behavioral sentences were followed by a photo that was stereotype congruent, stereotype
incongruent, or stereotype neutral with the behavior in the sentences. These primes, however,
still preceded the presentation of the trait-probe words to which participants were required to
respond by indicating whether or not the word had been in the sentence. Finally, some sentences
were presented without a preceding or subsequent photo at all. These sentences serve as a
baseline condition. I hypothesized stronger spontaneous trait inferences and, thus, slower and
less accurate responses to relevant trait probes when the behavior in the preceding sentence was
stereotype consistent with the face-type presented, compared to when this behavior was
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stereotype inconsistent. I expect these pattern of results only when the photo prime is presented
before the behavioral sentence and not after.
3.4.1

Participants

The sample consisted of 37 White participants and 13 non-White participants (8 female,
41 male, 1 nonbinary). The majority of participants (n = 29) were 25-35 years of age (9 = 18-25
years of age; 9 = 35-65 years of age; 3 = did not report).
3.4.2

Procedure

Like Experiment 1, the study was conducted on participants’ personal computing devices.
To ensure participants attended to the face presented, they were instructed to remember the actor
that performed the behavioral sentence. After participants consenting to the experiment via
button click, they were provided a brief explanation of the task. They were shown an example of
a face, behavioral sentence, and probe word. They were instructed to press “A” on the keyboard
if the probe word was shown in the behavioral sentence just presented and to press “L” on the
keyboard if it was not. Before the experiment began, participants completed a practice round of
trials consisting of 15 sentences and probes paired with photos. Participants were instructed that
these pictures referred to the actor in each sentence. Participants completed 102 trials, which
were presented in random order, with a 15s pause when participants were halfway through the
test to minimize errors due to fatigue. Each sentence described the behavior of an unknown actor
who was indicated with an X (e.g., “X hits the saleswoman”). The six trait-implying behavioral
sentences were presented five times resulting in 30 experimental trials: (a) once with a
stereotypically-congruent and (b) once with a stereotypically-incongruent face-type photo that
was presented for 2,000 ms before the stimulus sentence presentation; (c) once with a
stereotypically-congruent and (d) once with a stereotypically-incongruent face-type photo that
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was presented after the probe presentation for 2,000 ms and thus after the stimulus sentence; and
(e) once with no photo presented at all. In addition, 24 trait versions of the sentences paired with
photos (half shown with the photo shown before the sentence and half shown after the sentence)
were added to make sure each type of probe could elicit a “yes” answer or a “no” response (12
stereotype -consistent and 12 stereotype-inconsistent) and 12 trials with no probe at all. In total,
these 36 filler trials were presented two times, for the total of 102 trials per participant. At the
end of the experiment, participants answered demographic questions.
3.5

Experiment 3
Study 3 was identical to Study 2; however, faces were presented for 300 ms before or

after the behavioral sentences. I expected the same pattern of results as predicted for Study 2.
3.5.1

Participants

The sample for Experiment 3 included 39 White participants and 13 non-White
participants (9 female, 42 male, 1 nonbinary). The majority of participants (n = 31) were 25-35
years of age (8 = 18-25 years of age; 11 = 35-65 years of age; 2 = did not report).
3.5.2

Procedures

The experiment was presented as described in Experiment 2, with the two exceptions
being that (a) faces were presented briefly immediately before the sentences or the probes for
300 ms (vs 2,000 ms in Experiment 2), and (b) participants were not explicitly told prior to the
study that the face presented on the screen right before or after each sentence indicated
something about the actor (the X) in the sentence as they were in Experiment 2.

45
4
4.1

RESULTS

Experiment 1
4.1.1

Reaction Time

RTs faster than 200 ms and slower than 2,000 ms were regarded as invalid and thus
disregarded. This results in the exclusion of 1,635 (42%) trials1. The remaining RTs for accurate
trials were analyzed in a 2 (face-type: stereotypical vs nonstereotypical) X 2 (sentence type:
stereotypical vs neutral) X 2 (probe: literal vs implied) repeated-measures analysis of variance
(ANOVA). There was no significant difference in mean latency times when responding to trait
probes that followed stereotypical faces (M = 1,301 ms, SE = 56.61) compared to
nonstereotypical faces (M = 1,310 ms, SE = 56.31), F(1, 41) = 0.206, p = .652, ηp2 = .005. As
expected, there was a significant difference in response times when participants responded to
trait probes that followed stereotypical sentences (M = 1,327 ms, SE = 53.83, SE = 59.23)
compared to neutral sentences (M = 1,283 ms, SE = 59.23), F(1, 41) = 4.287, p = .045, ηp2 =
.095. However, there was no interaction between face-type and sentence type, F(1, 41) = .076, p
= .784, ηp2 = .002 (see Table 1).
It is worth noting that although I did not have any priori expectations regarding group
membership differences, there was also no difference between White (M = 1,347 ms, SE =
64.21) and non-White participants (M = 1,185 ms, SE = 107.79), F(1, 40) = 1.671, p = .204

1

Analyses were also completed with a 3,000 ms cutoff for invalid trials, which resulting in only 13%
excluded trials; however, this did not change the pattern of results, aside from there no longer being a main effect of
sentence type. For consistency with the proposal, the analyses with the 2,000 ms cutoff will be reported.
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Table 1: Means, Standard Deviations, and Analysis of Variance of Face-type and Sentence-Type
Reaction Times (in ms)
Measure

Stereotypical Face

Nonstereotypical Face

M

SE

M

SE

Stereotypical Sentence

1,325

55.59

1,329

54.79

Neutral Sentence

1,277

60.36

1,290

60.91

4.1.1

Error Rates

A 2 (face-type: stereotypical vs nonstereotypical) X 2 (sentence type: stereotypical vs
neutral) repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted to examine variations in response accuracy
on trials in which the probe word was implied (i.e., excluding literal probe word trials). There
was no difference in error rates for face-type, F(1, 41) = 2.575, p = .116, ηp2 = .055
(stereotypical, M = .181, SE = .01; nonstereotypical, M = .170, SE = .01); however, there was a
main effect for sentence type, F(1, 41) = 4.305, p = .044, ηp2 = .098. Participants had higher error
rates for stereotypical sentences (M = .187, SE = .01) compared to neutral sentences (M = .164,
SE = .01). There was no interaction for face-type and sentence-type, F(1, 41) = 0.823, p = .369,
ηp2 = .018.
4.2

Experiment 2
4.2.1

Reaction Time

RTs faster than 200 ms and slower than 2,000 ms were regarded as invalid and thus
disregarded (43% of trials)2. The remaining RTs for accurate trials were analyzed using a 2
(face-type: stereotypical vs nonstereotypical) X 2 (sentence type: stereotypical vs neutral) X 2
(prime condition: prime before vs prime after) repeated-measures ANOVA. There was no main

2

Analyses were also completed with a 3,000 ms cutoff for invalid trials, which resulting in only 25%
excluded trials; however, this did not change the pattern of results. For consistency with the proposal, the analyses
with the 2,000 ms cutoff will be reported.
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effect of face-type, F(1, 42) = 3.975, p = .053, ηp2 = .088, sentence type, F(1, 42) = 1.449, p =
.236, ηp2 = .034, or presentation of prime condition, F(1, 42) = .001, p = .972, ηp2 = .000. There
was no interaction between face-type and sentence type, F(1, 42) = .001, p = .863, ηp2 = .001.
There was no interaction between face-type and prime presentation, F(1, 42) = .073, p = .789, ηp2
= .002, nor between sentence type and prime presentation, F(1, 42) = 2.520, p = .120, ηp2 = .058.
Neither was there an interaction between these three variables, F(1, 42) = 1.463, p = .233, ηp2 =
.034 (see Table 2 and 3 for descriptive statistics).
Table 2: Face-type and Sentence-Type Reaction Times (in ms) when photo prime was presented
before behavioral sentence
Measure

Stereotypical Face

Nonstereotypical Face

M

SE

M

SE

Stereotypical Sentence

1,299

87

1,313

85

Neutral Sentence

1,228

77

1,279

81

Table 3: Face-type and Sentence-Type Reaction Times (in ms) when photo prime was presented
after behavioral sentence
Measure

Stereotypical Face

Nonstereotypical Face

M

SE

M

SE

Stereotypical Sentence

1,246

79

1,314

87

Neutral Sentence

1,279

79

1,296

79

However, when looking only at baseline trials (when no photo prime was present), there
was a main effect of sentence type, F(1, 42) = 11.191, p = .003, ηp2 = .348, such that people
responded faster to neutral sentences (M = 1332 ms, SE = 75.04) than to stereotypical sentences
(M = 1419 ms, SE = 69.89).
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4.2.2

Error Rates

A 2 (face-type: stereotypical vs nonstereotypical) X 2 (sentence type: stereotypical vs
neutral) repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted to examine variations in response error
rates. There was no difference in accuracy rates for face-type, F(1, 42) = .09, p = .780, ηp2 =
.002 (stereotypical, M = .19, SE = .009; nonstereotypical, M = .19, SE = .008) however, there
was a main effect for sentence type, F(1, 42) = 9.249, p = .004, ηp2 = .159. Participants had
higher error rates for stereotypical sentences (M = .201, SE = .008) compared to neutral
sentences (M = .172, SE = .008). There no interaction for face-type and sentence-type, F(1, 42) =
3.652, p = .062, ηp2 = .069.
4.3

Experiment 3
4.3.1

Reaction Time

RTs faster than 200 ms and slower than 2,000 ms were regarded as outliers and thus
disregarded (39% of trials)3. The remaining RTs for accurate trials were analyzed in a 2 (facetype: stereotypical vs nonstereotypical) X 2 (sentence type: stereotypical vs neutral) X 2 (prime
condition: prime before vs prime after) repeated-measures ANOVA. The results of these
analyses were similar to those from Experiment 2. There was no main effect of face-type, F(1,
44) = 3.975, p = .054 ηp2 = .088, sentence type, F(1, 44) = 1.532, p = .333, ηp2 = .034, or
presentation of prime, F(1, 44) = .045, p = .845, ηp2 = .001. There was no interaction between
face-type and sentence type, F(1, 41) = .001, p = .863, ηp2 = .001. There was no interaction
between face-type and prime presentation, F(1, 44) = .030, p = .864, ηp2 = .001, nor between

3

Analyses were also completed with a 3,000 ms cutoff for invalid trials, which resulting in only 19%
excluded trials; however, this did not change the pattern of results. For consistency with the proposal, the analyses
with the 2,000 ms cutoff will be reported.
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sentence type and prime presentation, F(1, 44) = .038, p = .847, ηp2 = .001. Neither was there an
interaction between these three variables, F(1, 44) = 1.598, p = .452, ηp2 = .033.
Table 4:Face-type and Sentence-Type Reaction Times (in ms) when photo prime was presented
before behavioral sentence
Measure

Stereotypical Face

Nonstereotypical Face

M

SE

M

SE

Stereotypical Sentence

1,339

81

1,327

84

Neutral Sentence

1,298

79

1,301

81

Table 5: Face-type and Sentence-Type Reaction Times (in ms) when photo prime was presented
after behavioral sentence
Measure

Stereotypical Face

Nonstereotypical Face

M

SE

M

SE

Stereotypical Sentence

1,281

85

1,326

87

Neutral Sentence

1,252

79

1,309

79

4.3.2

Error Rates

A 2 (face-type: stereotypical vs nonstereotypical) X 2 (sentence type: stereotypical vs
neutral) repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted to examine variations in response error
rates. There was no difference in accuracy rates for face-type, F(1, 44) = .802, p = .375, ηp2 =
.018 (stereotypical, M = .199, SE = .009; nonstereotypical, M = .183, SE = .008) however, there
was a main effect for sentence type, F(1, 44) = 7.528, p = .023, ηp2 = .159. Participants had
higher error rates for stereotypical sentences (M = .195, SE = .011) compared to neutral
sentences (M = .170, SE = .007). There no interaction for face-type and sentence-type, F(1, 44) =
1.366, p = .249 ηp2 = .030.
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5

DISCUSSION

Impression formation is an important aspect of interpersonal relations, particularly initial
or first impressions. People often spontaneously form impressions of others without necessarily
having any particular goal or an intention to do so (Todorov & Uleman, 2002). Impressions may
be influenced by a variety of characteristics and features in the social environment. As
mentioned, salient features about a person—such as gender, age, and race—can automatically
activate associated stereotypes and influence spontaneous inferences that impact impression
formation (Wigboldus, Dijksterhuis, & van Knippenberg, 2003; Wigboldus, Sherman, Franzese,
& van Knippenberg, 2004; Yan, Wang, & Zhang, 2012). Activated stereotypes can simplify
information processing by serving as efficiency devices and cognitive shortcuts (Macrae et al.,
1994). Although stereotypes allow individuals to handle issues more effortlessly and efficiently,
they also may cause inaccurate perceptions of others (Bargh, 1999; Fiske, 1998). Otherwise
typically occurring spontaneous trait inferences may be less likely when an activated stereotype
is inconsistent with a behavior. When considering the cognitive mechanisms that underpin this
phenomenon, the literature suggests spontaneous trait inferencing is the byproduct of the
objects/people we pay attention to, how we categorize those objects and the recall of previously
stored associations. Spontaneous trait inferences impact the judgments and decisions we make
about these objects and people particularly when the group membership of that object or person
is meaningful to us such as race/ethnicity.
Research suggests that stereotypes may impact the spontaneous inferences process
(Wigboldus et al., 2003) such that stereotype-consistent information results in more recall errors
compared to stereotype-inconsistent information. However, no research has been conducted to
investigate the degree to which racial stereotypes may impact the spontaneous trait inferencing
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process within a racial group; these studies have only focused on spontaneous trait inferencing
across racial groups. The purpose of this present research was to investigate how differences in
face-types (more or less representative of African Americans) would impact the spontaneous trait
inferencing process and subsequent memory for implied stereotypical traits. In three
experiments, participants were shown a variety of behavioral sentences paired with photographs
of people. Participants then saw a trait-probe word that was related to the behavior sentence. The
behavioral sentences stereotypical of African American individuals or neutral. The faces
presented also varied in the degree to which they were considered prototypical of a typical
African American face. I expected that the prototypicality of race would influence the
stereotypical associations that were activated. That is, I expected that the activation of
stereotypical knowledge would impact the speed at which people respond to the trait probe word.
In Experiment 1, I expected that, for stereotype-congruent face-type–behavior
combinations, the increased ease of access of stereotype congruent information should elicit the
inference of stereotypical information that was never presented, which would interfere with the
ability accurately to recognize a subsequent trait probe (whether it was presented or not).
However, when the behavior was incongruent with the activated stereotype, the increased
accessibility of behavior-incongruent traits and decreased accessibility of behavior-congruent
traits would be more likely to interfere with the spontaneous trait inferencing process (and thus,
easier to recognize whether a subsequent trait probe was present or not) evoked by the behavior.
Based on this reasoning, I hypothesized stronger spontaneous trait inferencing and, thus, slower
and less accurate responses to relevant trait probes when the behavior in the preceding sentence
was stereotype congruent with the face-type presented than when this behavior was stereotype
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incongruent. These primary hypotheses were not supported in the present experiment although
participants did generally respond quicker neutral sentences compared to stereotypical sentences.
I anticipated that the results of this study would further suggest that the differences in
reaction time for stereotype-congruent vs stereotype-incongruent sentences are not solely due to
stereotype activation. This would be evidenced by differences in stereotype-congruent vs
stereotype-neutral sentences. Alternatively, it may have been possible that the responses to
congruent and neutral face type-behavior combinations would be relatively slow not because of a
spontaneously inferred trait while reading the sentence but rather because of the relationship
between the trait and the sentence that becomes apparent only once the trait probe is presented.
Presenting photographs of faces after the behavior would help to confirm whether the results
occur due to initial encoding or a backwards integration mechanism. Study 2 (photo presentation
above the threshold of conscious awareness) and 3 (photo presentation below the threshold of
conscious awareness) were designed to address this issue by presenting photos both before and
after behavioral sentences.
In Experiment 2 and 3, I expected that participants would make greater spontaneous trait
inferences when the face-type and behavior are stereotype-congruent compared to incongruent.
The findings from these studies would further delineate whether this effect occurs due to the
increased accessibility of stereotype-congruent information or alternatively, the decrease of
stereotype incongruent information. Participants were expected to make quicker responses to
trait probes for stereotype incongruent face-type–behavior combinations than for stereotypecongruent combinations and the no-category baseline when the category prime preceded the
behavior presentation. This would suggest that when the behavior is incongruent with the
activated stereotype, the increased accessibility of stereotype-incongruent information and the
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decreased accessibility of stereotype-congruent information is likely to interfere with the
spontaneous trait inference process (weaker spontaneous trait inferences). Further, if this is the
case, stereotype-incongruent information presented after the behavioral information should not
interfere with the spontaneous trait inference process. That is, the relevant trait inference should
have already occurred once the incongruent face-type has been presented. These hypotheses,
however, also were not supported in the present experiments. However, baseline trails where no
photo prime was displayed also showed a main effect of sentence time suggesting that the results
from Experiment 1 have less to do with face-type interference and more to do with the sentences
themselves.
5.1

Theoretical Interpretations
Overall, none of the proposed hypotheses were supported in these experiments. One

theoretical perspective that should be considered is the degree to which schema-consistent and
scheme-inconsistent information aid in memory. Research comparing schema-consistent and
scheme-inconsistent information on memory seems to suggest that scheme-consistent
information should be most preferred in memory. However, classic research conducted by Hastie
and Kumar (1979) found that scheme-relevant information (whether consistent or inconsistent)
best determines the type of information that is best remembered. In those experiments, it was
proposed that when a photo stimulus is consistent with the behavioral sentence, this would cause
interference such that it would be harder to recall whether a later relevant probe was present or
not. However, research on scheme-inconsistent information seems to suggest that incongruent
information may actually lead to more associative links compared to incongruent links. Hastie
(1980) and Srull (1981) suggest that, from an associative network theory perspective,
incongruent information may get additional processing for people to make sense of the
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information being presented. For example, highly prejudiced individuals thoroughly process
stereotype-inconsistent information and are threatened by it (Sherman, Stroessner, Conrey, &
Azam, 2005). Incongruent information may be linked with additional items/nodes to aid in
retrieval compared to congruent information which is quickly processed with fewer associative
links needed to aid in retrieval. If this is the case, it is possible that incongruent pairs also were
linked to relevant probe words during the encoding process, which would have aided in retrieval
at test. However, it is also worth noting that memory for incongruent items depends somewhat
on additional time for processing and the proposed experiments did not allow much time for
additional processing so it would follow that this preference for incongruent information should
have been reduced (Dijksterhuis & Van Knippenberg, 1995; Garcia-Marques, Hamilton, &
Maddox, 2002; Macrae, Hewstone, & Griffiths, 1993) but it is unclear what that threshold of
“additional processing” is.
Another possible explanation is that although photos of stereotypical and
nonstereotypical faces were found to be significantly different from each other, perhaps during
the experimental phase this distinction was not different enough to garner the expected
differences in encoding and subsequent response time. Essentially, it is possible that no matter
what the stereotypicality of the face, if an African American/Black face is categorized as such,
then similar encoding processes related to stereotypes and implied traits will occur across all
faces within this category leading to no real differences across faces. This is consistent with other
category-label effects, such as the other-race (or cross-race) effect which suggests that people are
better at recognizing faces within their own race compared to outside of their race (Anzures et
al., 2013; Meissner, Brigham, & Butz, 2005). It is possible that the expected differences in
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response may only occur when faces are categorized into separate racial categories as illustrated
in the studies conducted by Stewart et al. (2003).
Further, although stereotypical faces were considered to be more consistent with certain
stereotypical behaviors and traits than others, this difference may not have been distinct enough
to illicit the interference proposed for subsequent studies, particularly when indexing latency
reaction times. Although efforts were taken to make sure the extremes of nonstereotypical and
stereotypical faces were used, when making quick judgments people may consider all faces to be
part of the same group and thus associated with certain stereotypical behaviors equally. If so, the
implications from these results may suggest that for certain decisions if a face is categorized as
African American, the proposed interference may occur regardless of face-type. This is
supported by the fact that participants did respond quicker to neutral sentences compared to
stereotypical sentences suggesting that sort of interference did occur for stereotypical behavioral
sentences when paired with any face. Previous research has shown that there are face-type
differences within racial group that do elicit differential responses in judgment and decisionmaking (Kleider-Offutt et al., 2017; Knuycky et al., 2014a; Knuycky, Kleider, & Cavrak,
2014b). However, these differences are not always shown in all paradigms. For example,
although Bond et al. (2021) found differential responses for faces based on face-type for
miscategorizations, we did not find the same when people made accurate categorizations of
faces. Results from this present research suggest that face-type does not garner differential
responses for spontaneous trait inferencing interference. Further research is needed to further
distinguish when we see these face-type differences.
Alternatively, these present studies differed from Wigboldus et al. (2003) in a potentially
important way. Wigboldus et al. (2003) used occupation labels (e.g., skinhead, professor) as their
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“category label.” They theorized that each of these category labels were associated with certain
stereotypes that would lead to the proposed encoding processes and subsequent errors. The
studies in this present research have two created categories, however, these categories are not
necessarily both associated with a particular set of stereotypes. What I designed in the present
study is one category (stereotypical faces) that has a high degree of features and traits
representative of African Americans. The second category (nonstereotypical faces) is a category
that lacks (some of) these features and traits and therefore may be less representative of African
Americans. That is, it is possible that nonstereotypical faces are not strongly associated with any
set of stereotypes (whether Black, White or any stereotypes relevant to the behavioral sentences
used in this study). If so, this would lead to no major differences in the encoding process and
subsequent response time. That is to say, in previous literature the categories used (either race or
occupation) may have been highly associated with certain stereotypes, whereas in this present
study one category (stereotypical faces) is associated with categorical stereotypes whereas the
other category (nonstereotypical faces) is simply less strongly associated with those same
stereotypes. This may have led to both groups still being encoded similarly when paired with
stereotypical behavioral sentences.
5.2

Limitations
Due to restrictions and limitations accompanying data collection in a pandemic, it was

necessary to transition many experiments to an online platform. Although this transition has had
many benefits, it has also come with its challenges and limitation. This transitioned to online
platforms has come with many benefits but have also come challenges (Aguinis, Villamor, &
Ramani, 2021; Kan & Drummey, 2018). Although multiple attention checks were used
throughout the study to ensure engagement (e.g., asking participants what are the colors fo the
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US flag), perhaps some users are so accustomed to navigating these checks that they did not
serve the purpose as intended. Hauser and Schwarz (2016) report that MTurk users perform
better on attention checks than do subject pool participants. They suggest that this means
participants a generally more attentive to instructions compared to subject pool participants.
Although this could be true, this also could mean that MTurk participants are regularly exposed
to similar attention checks and therefore know to expect them but may still disengage from the
actual experiment.
Related to the use of using an online platform, there are also many technical limitations
and challenges that should be noted that may have impacted the results found in these
experiments. First, was the general issue of participants potentially seeing confusing images.
Multiple participants reported in the comments section that they seemed to see flashes of
programming language/figures in between slides that were distracting from the overall
experiment. This may have been particularly a problem for the experiments that were
intentionally investigating how images displayed below the threshold of conscious awareness
may impact latency responses. Upon my review of the experiments on different browsers,
approximately one out of ten times, there were brief flashes of images/language that were not
intended for the participants to see. Another concern that may review articles on online studies
point out (Barnhoorn, Haasnoot, Bocanegra, & van Steenbergen, 2015), are the differences in
personal computers and hardware. These differences lead to limitations in controlling for
buffering time, presentation lags, image displays, etc. Even within individual response time,
there were still many instances where the latency response time for one trial was drastically
different from the response time to a different trial such that uses the individual average response
time as a means of correction in cleaning data did not seem to be very useful. Finally, generally
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speaking, the Qualtrics platform is well known for its use in collecting survey-related data. Using
this platform for reaction time experimental data seemed to be a bit challenging for the platform
particularly related to getting accurate timing (as nuanced as milliseconds). The best this
platform could accommodate was a timestamp for the moment a page was submitted. Although
advancement/submission of a page was programming to be linked to the actual participant key
response, it remains unclear whether the key response was the actual time recorded or moments
later when a page was recorded to have been submitted (potentially after some lag or buffering).
If the reaction time recorded was actually linked to some later time after a potential lag and
buffering and not the actual key response, then many responses were not actually true to the
participants' judgments.
Based on some feedback from participants, it is possible that there is an expectation of
the amount of time spent or the type of studies that are conducted on the web-based data
collection platform, MTurk. Although participants were compensated the average MTurk
compensation of $2.00, it is possible that the compensation was not comparable to the amount of
time and effort required of participants. If participants had an expectation of completing a survey
in 30 minutes, they may be more likely to disengage at around 30 minutes rather than completing
the full experiment with equivalent engagement throughout. Aguinis et al. (2021) summarize ten
challenges of working specifically with MTurk samples. One primary challenge to consider is
inattention. MTurk users often complete experiments in a distracting environment and do so as
quickly as possible to maximize their monetary gains. MTurk users are also less likely to pay
attention to study instructions or manipulations but rather to immediately advance through these
parts of the presentation (Aguinis et al., 2021). Last, compared with student in-person samples,
online participants are significantly more likely to be distracted due to cell phone use (MTurker
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= 21% vs. student = 9%), internet surfing (MTurker = 11% vs. student = 1%), or conversing with
another person (MTurker = 21% vs. student = 2%; (Aguinis et al., 2021). These challenges could
have been particularly detrimental to obtaining optimal data related to reaction time where
timing is being investigated down to milliseconds.
There are a few additional concerns that Aguinis et al. (2021) summarized that should be
noted. First, there seems to be a moderate percentage of MTurk workers who may misrepresent
their self-reported demographic information including but not limited to their income, education,
age, and gender in order to meet the criteria of the study. This could be anywhere from 10% to
13%, to 24% to 83% (Aguinis et al., 2021). Kan and Drummey (2018) found that in the presence
of explicit eligibility requirements, 21.8% (Study 2) to 55.8% (Study 1) of participants
misrepresented themselves in order to qualify for the studies (55.8% in Study 1 and 21.8% in
Study 2). In some cases, people may alter their IP address information to so that it appears as a
US location. Although the stereotypes proposed in these studies have consistently been shown to
be ubiquitous in the literature, it is possible, particularly in cases where someone is not actually
from the US, that these stereotypes do not apply in the same way for the people that may
misrepresent their identities.
5.3

Future Directions
Future investigations of this research question will analyze these data for evidence of

change across trials (e.g., did participants learn to distinguish between stereotypical and
nonstereotypical faces) and to examine effects of or correlations with the other variables in the
present dataset (e.g., education, geography, income, political affiliation). Future direction will
also aim to replicate previous findings between Black and White individuals using this paradigm.
Given the technical and theoretical limitations of this present study, in the future I will attempt to
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mitigate some of the technical concerns by running these same experiments in a traditional
laboratory setting. The participants will be taken to a physical laboratory where they will
complete the above studies on a laboratory computer monitored by the research team. This
method would serve as a replication of the above findings, address the current potential
limitations, and support that overall findings that all African America faces, regardless of facetype, were judged similarly. Investigating these differences will help to further determine the
degree to which the distinction between nonstereotypical and stereotypical faces impacted
results. If my research team finds the expected results for Black and White faces, but still does
not find the expected results with stereotypical and nonstereotypical Black faces, then this would
further suggest that the distinction between stereotypical and nonstereotypical Black faces is not
enough to garner differential results. But rather that, no matter how representative a face is of a
race, as long as that face is categorized as being Black/African American, the face may
automatically be associated with certain stereotypes which impact spontaneous trait inferencing
in similar ways.
Future research should also investigate other potential moderating variables that have
impacted these types of studies in the past such as the level of prejudice and motivation to
control prejudice (Olson & Fazio, 2004) as well as other cognitive abilities that have shown to
individual differences in decision-making such as working memory and cognitive load (KleiderOffutt, Clevinger, & Bond, 2016; Kleider, Parrott, & King, 2010). Previous research has found
that individual differences in working memory accompanied with cognitive load have impacted
the degree to which individuals potentially use stereotypical information as a means for decisionmaking. It is possible that certain people in this present research may be more likely to elicit the
expected reactions (e.g., high working memory vs low working memory; high prejudice vs low
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prejudice) but these groups were not captured in the present research. Other research
investigating levels of prejudice and motivation to control prejudice has found that certain
individuals may be more likely to “bend over backward” to appear unbiased or in some cases, to
not appear to lenient towards stereotyped groups. Because demand characters may have been a
concern in this present research, this may be a moderating variable worth considering in future
lines of this research. Because spontaneous trait inferencing seems to fall on the automatic to
controlled spectrum therefore may be truly automatic (Heider, 1982), it is possible that demand
characteristics still impacted responses.
Although most of my presented hypotheses were not supported in this present line of
research, these data have (as research goes) elicited more questions to be explored in the future.
Currently, implications from this present research could suggest that no matter how
representative a face may be of a racial category, if that face is categorized within a particular
race, there may similar consequences in the initial impression formation stages for all faces.
However, future research must be conducted related to these questions. That is to say, this is only
the beginning!
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APPENDICES
Appendix A

Appendix A.1: Stereotypical Sentence and Probe Stimuli (Stewart et al., 2008)
Dated several women at the same time
Failed an introductory course twice
Impressed his friends with his a cappella vocal performance
Made three touchdowns in one game
Was caught shoplifting at a department store
Was the center of attention at parties because of his jokes

Appendix A.2: Neutral Sentence Stimuli (Wigboldus et al., 2003)
Buys a new coat
Collects his groceries
Cycles through the street
Eats a sandwich
Orders a cup of coffee
Walks through town

promiscuous
unintelligent
musical
athletic
criminal
funny

